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CRIMINAL LAW - AMNESIA AS TO THE EVENTS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DOES NOT BY ITSELF JUSTIFY A FIND-
ING OF INCOMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL. Morrow v. State,
293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982).
Defendant's passenger was killed as a result of a head-on collision
with another vehicle. Before trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County held a competency hearing in response to the defendant's claim
of amnesia as to the events leading up to the accident. The court deter-
mined that the defendant was competent to stand trial and he was sub-
sequently convicted by a jury of manslaughter by automobile.' Upon
appeal,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered for the first time
whether an amnesic defendant is competent to stand trial. In interpret-
ing the state's competency statute3 the court held that amnesia alone, as
to the events of the crime charged, does not justify a finding of
incompetence.4
The competency doctrine has its genesis in the common law prohi-
bition against trials in abstentia. I Founded on the belief that fairness
requires the accused to be mentally as well as physically present at
trial,6 the common law rule developed that an accused was considered
1. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982). Amnesia is generally defined
as a disturbance or impairment of memory. 8A L. CHAPMAN, COURTROOM
MEDICINE § 123.10 (1982). An expert psychiatrist testified that Morrow suffered
post-traumatic amnesia as a result of the head injuries he sustained in the acci-
dent. Thus, Morrow was unable to recall events before, during, and after the
accident as the result of genuine and permanent amnesia. However, the psychia-
trist testified that, with the exception that Morrow would be unable to answer his
attorney's questions concerning the events surrounding the accident, Morrow un-
derstood the nature and object of the proceedings against him and would be able
to consult with his attorney. 293 Md. at 249, 443 A.2d at 110.
2. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Morrow's conviction by hold-
ing that his post-traumatic injury did not prevent him from assisting in his defense
and, moreover, did not preclude him from receiving a fair trial. 47 Md. App. 296,
423 A.2d 251 (1980), affid, 293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982).
3. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -106 (1982). In particular, the stat-
ute provides that "[i]f, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case
appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall determine, on
evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand
trial." Id § 12-102(a). The statute defines "incompetent to stand trial" as "not
able: (1) [t]o understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) Itlo assist in
one's defense." Id § 12-101(c). At the time of the Morrow decision the preceding
statute was codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 (1979). The revision resulted
in no substantive change to the statute.
4. 293 Md. at 253, 443 A.2d at 112. Morrow was found not guilty of both driving
while intoxicated and driving while ability was impaired. Id at 249, 443 A.2d at
110. In addition, the court ruled that Morrow's failure to make a timely objection
to a jury instruction in accordance with MD. R.P. 757(f) barred appellate review
of two allegedly erroneous jury instructions. 293 Md. at 258, 443 A.2d at 114.
5. See generally Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial. A Pre- and Post- Jackson Anay-
sis, 40 TENN. L. REV. 659, 660 n.l 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gobert].
6. See generally Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 560, 561 (1973); Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Sepa-
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mentally competent to stand trial if he was able to conduct a rational
defense7 and could understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him.' The doctrine is concerned with the accused's present
mental competency as opposed to his mental condition at the time of
the alleged offense.9 Of the several policy considerations underlying
the competency doctrine, most fundamental is that it ensures the accu-
racy of the adjudication.'0
Many American jurisdictions readily adopted the common law
competency doctrine," although it was not until 1967 that Maryland
adopted the doctrine by amending its competency statute. 12 Prior to
1967, Maryland utilized the A'Naghten test as the standard for ascer-
taining both competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility at
the time of the alleged offense. 13 The 1967 amendments, therefore,
rating Those Unfit for Adversary Combat From Those Who Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J.
666, 669-71 (1978).
7. Eg., Frith's Case, 22 How. St. Trials 307, 318 (1790); see also 1 HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 34-35. The principle embodied in these materials-that an incompe-
tent defendant not be tried until he regains his competency-was later codified by
Parliament in the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94 (1800),
reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 593 (2d ed. 1948).
8. Commentators have given several explanations for the development of this com-
mon law rule. First, social policy requires that the accused understand what he is
being punished for. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial 81 HARV. L. REV. 454,
458 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note]. Second, fairness requires that the accused
understand that he is being tried in a criminal court, that he understand the pro-
ceedings, and that he know what offense he committed. Lindsay, Fitness to Stand
Trial in Canada." An Overview in Light of the Recommendations of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 303, 306 n.10 (1976-77). Third, the compe'-
tency doctrine also ensures the accuracy of the fact-finding process by safeguard-
ing several rights afforded the accused, such as the constitutional right to a jury
trial, the right to confront witnesses, and to call witnesses in his own behalf. See
U.S.CONST. amend. VI. Lastly, the accused has the right to have his guilt deter-
mined beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see
Gobert, supra note 5, at 659.
9. Swisher v. United States, 354 F.2d 472, 474 (8th Cir. 1966).
10. Note, supra note 8, at 457.
11. The first reported American case to acknowledge the common law competency
doctrine was in 1835. United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 889-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1835) (No. 15,577) (defendant assaulted President Andrew Jackson by at-
tempting to shoot him as he left the Capitol).
12. Act of May 4, 1967, 1967 Md. Laws 709. The precursor to the present competency
statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 7 (1964), originally enacted in 1827, Act of
Mar. 9, 1827, 1827 Md. Laws 197, was modeled after England's Criminal Lunatics
Act of 1800. See supra note 7. For an excellent historical survey of the evolution
of the Maryland competency statute prior to the 1967 amendments see Rowe v.
State, 234 Md. 295, 199 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 924 (1964).
13. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Maryland adopted the M'Naghten, or
right-wrong, test in 1888 as the standard for determining criminal responsibility.
Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 37-39, 13 A. 809, 812-14 (1888). The present Mary-
land competency statute, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -106
(1982), mirrors both the federal competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976), and
the Model Penal Code rule regarding competency. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04,
10 U.L.A. 492 (1974).
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brought Maryland in line with the federal 4 and state' 5 statutes gov-
erning competency. In Dusky v. United States, 16 a 1960 decision inter-
preting the federal competency statute, the United States Supreme
Court held that an accused is competent to stand trial "if he has suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding" and "has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him."' 7 Known as the Dusky
standard most jurisdictions, including Maryland,'" have utilized it in
analyzing the competency of defendants to stand trial.' 9
Morrow v. State2" thus confronted the court with an issue of first
impression in Maryland: whether a defendant suffering from amnesia
as to the events of the crime charged is competent to stand trial within
the meaning of the state's competency statute.' Writing for a unani-
mous court, Judge Cole emphasized that the issues of competency and
the right to a fair trial are separate.22 With respect to competency, the
court applied the Dusky standard to the Maryland competency statute
and held that amnesia alone, as to the events of the crime charged, does
not justify a finding of incompetence. 23 Since Morrow could under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and could
assist his counsel, the court deemed him competent.24 In support of its
holding the court reasoned that everyone is amnesic to some degree,
25
and that amnesia is analogous to being home, asleep in bed at the time
of the crime26 or to the loss of memory due to drugs or intoxication.27
In addition, the court believed that there is the potential for fraud in a
14. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976). Enacted in 1949, this statute provides in pertinent part
that a person is mentally incompetent if he is "unable to understand the proceed-
ings against him or properly to assist in his own defense ... ." Id
15. Note, Amnesia." The Forgotten Justoqcation for Finding an Accused Incompetent to
Stand Trial, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 289, 290 n. 17 (1981).
16. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
17. Id at 403.
18. Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 297-98, 372 A.2d 1069, 1072 (1977).
19. Eg., Commonwealth v. Griffin, 622 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Ky. 1981); Barnett v. State,
618 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Mo. 1981). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 544, 553
(1972).
20. 293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982).
21. In a 1976 case involving a defendant who alleged amnesia, the court of special
appeals did not address the issue presented here since the jury in that case found
that the defendant was not suffering from genuine amnesia. James v. State, 31
Md. App. 666, 688 n.9, 358 A.2d 595, 608 n.9, cert. denied, 278 Md. 725 (1976).
22. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 256, 443 A.2d 108, 113 (1982).
23. Id at 253, 443 A.2d at 112.
24. Id at 256, 443 A.2d at 113.
25. See State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 577, 234 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1977); Note, Amne-
sia.'A Case Study in the Limits of Particular Justice, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 111 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Amnesia].
26. See United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972) (quoting Amnesia, supra note 25, at 128).
27. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 253, 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982). See State v. Wil-
lard, 292 N.C. 567, 577, 234 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1977).
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claim of amnesia.28
The court's holding in Morrow is well-reasoned and reflects a
pragmatic yet sensitive approach to the issue of whether an amnesic
defendant is competent to stand trial. The Morrow court makes clear
that an amnesic defendant will have to establish a defect other than his
amnesia to come within the purview of the competency statute.29 What
that additional defect is was left unanswered by the court. However,
implicit in the court's opinion is that a finding of incompetence may be
justified by a defect which coalesces with a defendant's amnesia so as to
render him unable to assist his counsel or to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him. This approach is in concert with
that taken by other jurisdictions30 and represents the more analytically
sound approach since it ensures the integrity of the competency statute.
The court's pragmatism is illustrated by its view that everyone is
amnesic to some degree.3' In sharing this view, other jurisdictions32
and commentators 33 have emphasized that the loss of memory alone
should not provide the basis for interrupting the adjudicatory process.
Underlying this view is the contention that evidentiary and procedural
rules are calculated to ensure a workable balance of the interests of the
parties involved.34 In light of these safeguards, two serious problems
would have arisen had the court reversed Morrow's conviction by find-
ing him incompetent solely on the basis of his amnesia. First, Morrow
could not have been institutionalized since amnesia is not a mental ill-
ness. 35 Second, Morrow would have avoided criminal liability because
his permanent amnesia rendered him incompetent.36 Therefore, the
practical effect would have been to permit Morrow and other amnesic
defendants to avoid responsibility for their criminal conduct. As a re-
sult, the state's interest in the prosecution of those who engage in crimi-
nal conduct would have been unduly hampered and the safety and
28. See sources cited supra note 27.
29. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 253, 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982).
30. For a list of jurisdictions, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 544, 553 (1972). Cf. People v.
Jackson, 88 A.D.2d 604, 606, 449 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (1982) (a defect which im-
pairs the defendant's reason and comprehension or hampers his ability to consult
with his counsel may be physical as well as mental).
31. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 254, 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982).
32. E.g., United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972); United States ex rel Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1072-73
(D.Del. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Parson v. Anderson, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973);
State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977).
33. E.g., Amnesia, supra note 25, at 136.
34. Id
35. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 375 So.2d 1379, 1383 (La. 1979). See generally Lewin,
Incompetency to Stand Trial- Legal and Ethical Aspects of an Abused Doctrine,
1969 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 233.
36. Under the Maryland competency statute, an individual found incompetent cannot
be tried until he regains his competency. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-
101 to -106 (1982).
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security of society would have been jeopardized.37 The Morrow court
thus struck a judicious balance between the societal interest in the
efficient administration of its criminal justice system and the rights
afforded the criminally accused.3" In sum, as the court noted, the integ-
rity of the judicial process is not compromised since all amnesic de-
fendants will be tried.39
Courts have taken two basic approaches in determining the com-
petency of amnesiacs to stand trial. A minority of jurisdictions have
adopted a case-by-case approach in analyzing the competency of am-
nesic defendants to stand trial. For example, in Wilson v. United
States, I a federal court set forth six factors to be used on a case-by-
case basis to determine the competency of an amnesic defendant to
stand trial." While other courts have considered varying factors,42 a
majority of jurisdictions have dismissed the case-by-case approach and
have instead held that amnesia alone, as to the events of the crime
charged, does not constitute incompetence.4 3 Of the several policy jus-
37. See Commonwealth ex rel Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 401, 218 A.2d 758,
763, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
38. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 256, 443 A.2d 108, 113 (1982).
39. Id
40. 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
41. The factors set forth by the Wilson court are:
(1) the extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to
consult with and assist his lawyer; (2) the extent to which the amnesia
affected the defendant's ability to testify in his own behalf; (3) the extent
to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view
of the defendant's amnesia. Such evidence would include evidence re-
lating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi; (4) the
extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel
in that reconstruction; (5) the strength of the prosecution's case. Most
important here will be whether the Government's case is such as to ne-
gate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial
possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi
or other defense, it should be presumed that he would have been able to
do so; and (6) any other facts and circumstances which would indicate
whether or not the defendant had a fair trial.
Id at 463-64.
42. See United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1978); Aldridge v.
State, 247 Ga. 142, 146, 274 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1981). The courts utilizing a factor-
type approach are not in harmony as to the stated factors. Compare Thompson v.
State, 364 So.2d 683, 684 n. 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (factors include existence of
history of irrational behavior, prior medical opinion, and accused's demeanor at
trial) and Davis v. State, 354 So.2d 334, 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (same) with
Aldridge v. State, 247 Ga. 142, 146, 274 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1981) (factors include
defendant's present ability to testify on matters other than the event he cannot
remember, presence or absence of other logical conditions that would hinder his
present ability to assist his counsel, the ability of the parties to reconstruct events
without defendant's testimony, the strength of the prosecution's case against the
defendant, and access to the prosecution's files in assisting the defendant to pre-
pare his defense).
43. E.g., United States v. Mota, 598 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Flores v. United States, 444 U.S. 1084 (1979); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 577,
234 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1977).
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tifications given in support of the latter approach," most pervasive is
the contention that amnesia neither affects the accused's ability to com-
prehend his position nor his ability to consult intelligently with counsel
in preparing a defense.45 Consequently, although these courts gener-
ally view amnesia as an unfortunate condition, it does not warrant a
finding of incompetence. 46
The Morrow court also rejected the case-by-case approach in favor
of the majority view that amnesia alone does not justify a finding of
incompetence. In fashioning no new analytical models or approaches,
the court gleaned its rationale from other jurisdictions which have held
the same. For instance, in Reagon v. State, 47 a case factually analogous
to that of Morrow, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that since an
amnesic defendant is no more handicapped than a defendant who has
lost evidence or who has been prejudiced by the death of a material
witness, the amnesic defendant must stand trial.4" In embracing this
rationale as a major basis for rejecting Morrow's argument for a case-
by-case approach, the Court of Appeals of Maryland sensibly reasoned
that it would be inequitable to carve an exception in the competency
doctrine for amnesic defendants. To be sure, the universal incidence of
amnesia makes it impossible to consider amnesiacs as a class deserving
special protection.49
Another equally compelling reason cited by the court is the prob-
lem of fraud which necessarily accompanies a claim of amnesia. One
court has held that the high potential for fraudulent allegations of
memory loss can provide the sole basis for not expanding the compe-
44. One court has set forth three policy reasons for not expanding the competency
doctrine: (1) society cannot permit amnesia to serve as a basis for permanently,
completely, and absolutely negating all criminal liability; (2) the amnesic defend-
ant may escape criminal liability on the basis of self-serving statements made to
the jury; and (3) expansion of the doctrine will greatly jeopardize the safety and
security of society and render the protection of society from crime and criminals
far more difficult. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 401, 218
A.2d 758, 763, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966). In Morrow, the court of special
appeals indicated that the defendant is not precluded from exercising his sixth and
fourteenth amendment constitutional rights, such as his right to challenge jurors
and to confront the witnesses against him, to summon witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel. Morrow v. State, 47 Md. App. 296, 301, 423
A.2d 251, 254 (1980), aff#d, 293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982). In addition, the
amnesic defendant can still be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
and make rational decisions regarding his defense. 47 Md. App. at 301, 423 A.2d
at 254.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Alley, 661 F.2d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 1981); United States
ex rel. Coleman v. Hicks, 498 F. Supp. 636, 644 (D.N.J. 1980).
46. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 622 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Ky. 1981). As the Grffin
court explained, "[m]emory is, after all, only one source of ascertaining the facts
surrounding the event for which a crime is charged." Id
47. 253 Ind. 143, 251 N.E.2d 829 (1969).
48. Id at 147, 251 N.E.2d at 831.
49. See United States v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1969).
356 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 12
tency doctrine to include amnesia.5" While not going to this extreme,
the court of appeals nonetheless indicated that this is a valid policy
consideration since it is difficult to distinguish between an individual
suffering from genuine amnesia and one who is merely feigning it.5
Holdings in accordance with that in Morrow invariably cite this policy
consideration.52
With respect to the right to a fair trial, the court found that Mor-
row received a fair trial because his amnesia did not thwart the
accuracy of the fact-finding process.53 Indeed, since the great weight of
evidence against Morrow was physical, such as a blood alcohol test
which revealed that he was legally intoxicated, it is quite doubtful
whether Morrow's amnesia would have significantly affected his ability
to assist in his defense. Moreover, together with the full pre-trial access
Morrow had to the evidence the state intended to introduce at trial and
the strong evidence against him, the court correctly concluded that
Morrow was not denied a fair trial.
In State v. Austad, 4 a recent decision analyzing this issue, the
court intimated that an amnesic defendant receives a fair trial when the
bulk of the evidence against him is physical; his mental state and his
alibi have little effect upon the evidence; the circumstantial evidence
against him is strong; and he receives much prosecutorial assistance. 55
The court of appeals applied this same logic in Morrow. However, it is
unclear whether the court's holding in Morrow indicates that only
when the evidence against the accused is weak will the court seriously
entertain the accused's argument that he did not receive a fair trial. It
is unfortunate that the Morrow court left this question unanswered for
there may be future instances when a trial court will be confronted with
a case supported entirely by weak evidence against the amnesic defend-
ant. In such a case, since it is unclear what steps a court should take in
ensuring that the amnesic defendant receives a fair trial, there is the
potential for inconsistent results. However, in United States v.
Borum, 6 the Tenth Circuit indicated that when the evidence of guilt is
50. Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802 (Alaska 1974). But cf. State v. McClendon,
103 Ariz. 105, 108, 437 P.2d 421, 424 (1968) (specious to base decision solely on
the possibility that the defendant may be feigning amnesia).
51. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 254, 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982).
52. See Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802 (Alaska 1974). American military courts
have been particularly suspect of all cases involving amnesiacs due to this very
reason. United States v. Watson, 18 C.M.R. 391, 401 (1954); United States v.
Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 142, 15 C.M.R. 134, 142 (1954); United States v. Lopez-
Malave, 4 C.M.A. 341, 346-47, 15 C.M.R. 341, 346-47 (1954).
53. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 256, 443 A.2d 108, 114 (1982).
54. 641 P.2d 1373 (Mont. 1982).
55. Id at 1379. Interestingly, the Austad court cogently noted that no federal courts
dealing with the issue of the competency of amnesic criminal defendants to stand
trial in the decade after Wilson adopted the Wilson standard. See supra note 41.
Instead, those courts, as did the Austad court, adopted the less stringent Dusky
standard. ld at 1378.
56. 464 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1972).
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less than overwhelming, it is incumbent upon the court to determine
whether the defendant was deprived of any defense which would have
otherwise been available to him but for his amnesia.17 Although the
overwhelming evidence against Morrow made it unnecessary for the
Court of Appeals of Maryland to set forth guidelines, it nonetheless
would have been helpful had the court established criteria to assist trial
courts in making a determination of what types of evidence will ensure
that an amnesic defendant receives a fair trial.
The court's decision in Morrow makes clear that a defendant will
not be able to avoid criminal liability on the basis of amnesia alone.
Equally clear is that for a defendant to be found incompetent he will
have to establish a defect other than his amnesia. The impact of Mor-
row, although substantial in terms of addressing whether an amnesic
defendant is competent under the state competency statute, is necessar-
ily limited due to the infrequency with which amnesia is raised as a
basis of incompetence in Maryland. Nevertheless, the court's accurate
interpretation of the competency statute will provide helpful guidance
in future cases.
Kevin L. Shepherd
57. Id. at 900.
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